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Abstract 
The most basic representation of a supply chain has three elements: supply, 
demand, and the flow between the two. A humanitarian response supply chain 
(RSC) tends to have unknown demand and at best uncertain supply with disrupted 
flow. A self-sustaining supply chain requires that the supply chain itself provide all 
resources consumed while transporting supplies, thus complicating the operations 
with numerous challenges and unfamiliar issues. If an RSC is self-sustaining, it will 
reduce some of the uncertainties in supply. However, self-sustaining response 
supply chains (SSRSC) generate significant additional cost. We explore the issues 
and challenges of SSRSC that arise in logistics networks in order to understand the 
costs associated with SSRSC observed in special operations and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. 
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Issues and Challenges in Self-Sustaining 
Response Supply Chains 
Introduction 
Disasters in recent years have offered many lessons. One lesson is the 
economic reality of the increasing cost of a disaster. The cost has risen dramatically, 
from US$16.1 billion per year in 1992–2001 to US$40 billion per year in 2002–2011 
(Jones, 2013). The cost increase can be attributed to the complexity of operations in 
humanitarian logistics. Humanitarian logistics has been defined as “that special 
branch of logistics which manages response supply chain of critical supplies and 
services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, critical time-
windows in face of infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of the 
operations” (Apte, 2009, p. 17). Practitioners (Eisner, 2007; Fenton, 2008; Nelon, 
2008) and scholars (Celik et al., 2012; Holguin-Veras et al., 2009; Kovacs & Spens, 
2007; Van Wassenhove, 2006) agree that preparation is a significant part of relief 
effort. Understanding the effect of complexity of operations on the cost is one way to 
improve planning. 
Availability of the supplies is assumed in most supply chains. However, for 
response supply chains (RSCs) in disaster-struck regions, this may not necessarily 
be true. Sustainability and self-reliance are two of the important aspects of a 
response supply chain. We define a self-sustaining response supply chain (SSRSC) 
as a supply chain established in response to a disaster, where there are resources 
consumed in intermediate stages that are not locally available, and therefore must 
be supplied through the chain itself. It has been shown that self-sustaining supply 
chains increase resource requirements, manpower, and equipment, resulting in 
significantly higher cost (Regnier, E., Simon, J., Nussbaum, D., & Whitney, L., 
2013a; Regnier, E., Simon, J. , & Nussbaum, D., 2013b).  
In this report, we explore the challenges and issues in a SSRSC. We focus on 
operations from an economic perspective. Fundamentally, our work is based on 
literature survey and discussions with subject matter experts. In our exploration, 
therefore, we are limited by absence of actual data. We believe this could develop 
into the second phase of this research study. At present, we focus on conceptual 
and stylized scenarios. However, we have extensively studied the topics of response 
supply chain and analyzed costs associated with self-sustaining supply chains. We 
are beginning this effort of exposing the vein of research in this new area by 
combining the two research streams from RSC and SSSC for exposing the issues 




The article is organized as follows. In the section entitled Supply Chains, we 
offer background on different types of supply chains.  Next, we review the literature 
for sustainable supply chains and response supply chains in order to understand the 
issues and challenges. After this we describe the potential problem, discuss the 
expected results, and finally, we offer the conclusion.  
Supply Chains 
We can partition supply chains into three broad categories in terms of how the 
supply chain manages material—traditional, sustainable, and self-sustaining. 
Traditional supply chains that function in traditional logistics networks have been well 
studied in operations management. Sustainable supply chains (SSC) have received 
considerable attention in this age of green consciousness and fiscal austerity and 
can be measured by looking at their agility, adaptability, and alignment (Lee, 2004). 
SSC often achieve these through “The Three R’s,” reduction, reuse, and recycling—
the latter two “R’s” tend to be performed outside of the traditional supply chain. Self-
sustaining supply chains extend themselves beyond the reuse and recycling. They 
require that some of the resources consumed in the logistical activities of 
transporting supplies to their destinations be provided via the supply network itself. 
This makes self-sustaining supply chains even more complex; they essentially 
become supply chain islands, where the network must be 
x nimble enough to transport, create, conserve, and consume supply;  
x flexible enough to repair and reuse the waste that it produces; and  
x rigid enough to fulfill the ultimate demand of the supply chain while 
simultaneously fulfilling its own needs during the process of delivering 
the good or service it promises. 
In addition to the management of material, one important aspect of supply 
chains is the environment in which they operate. At one end of the spectrum are 
traditional supply chains with less variable fluctuations in demand; on the other end 
are ‘response’ supply chains in which supply, demand, customers, and network 
configurations continuously change due to unpredictability. A supply chain in its most 
basic form encompasses three elements: supply, demand, and flow, with flow being 
the intermediary between the other two components. Typically, a traditional supply 
chain supplies a pre-established, standardized product to customers to meet a 
relatively constant and forecasted demand through structured resources and 
continuous flow. In contrast, at any given time, a humanitarian response supply 
chain supplies a wide range of products and services fulfilling spurts of demand 
while sharing the flow and capacity with other relief items (Apte, 2009). Traditional 




uncertainties. Supply chains stressed in this way—extreme supply chains—need 
special attention from the researchers.   
Sustainable, self-sustaining, and response supply chains are becoming more 
relevant to the Department of Defense (DoD) as we proceed through the 21st 
century. A major reason for this is the the era of fiscal austerity that the United 
States has entered after the 2008 financial crisis. The U.S. DoD budget is tighter, so 
it must be able to maintain the same capabilities as in the past while using fewer 
resources. Thus sustainability and self-sustainment become increasingly important 
for the DoD. Strategic changes also drive the growing importance of response 
supply chains; as people move to more disaster-prone areas of the world, the U.S. 
military will continue to play a major role in being the first responders in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Also, the face of conflict has tacked towards 
more irregular enemies vice large armed forces, thus requiring smaller, independent 
teams that coexist with each other over long periods of time.   
Virtually every supply chain, regardless of whether it is self-sustaining or not, 
shares common characteristics such as supply, inventory, distribution networks, 
flows, lead-times, information systems, customers, demands, and key performance 
indicators. In this research, we study the similarities and differences of SSRSCs with 
SSSCs to expose the challenges in SSRSC in terms of operations. We believe 
studying operations is the first step to understand the burden of cost in such supply 
chains (Regnier et al., 2013a; 2013b).  
When a self-sustaining supply chain is initiated, it is endowed with a certain 
set of goods. These goods are used to sustain the SSSC itself during the transport, 
and these may also be the same types of items that it is attempting to deliver to its 
customers. When a self-sustaining supply chain begins, it has a limited amount of 
space to carry all of the goods being delivered and consumed during the delivery. 
Therefore, the choice of goods to carry is critical in that the SSSC cannot restock 
during the delivery process. The carriers must be efficient, innovative, and 
sustainable in their use of goods—they must have the tools to not only reach their 
destination, but also to have the provisions that the customer desires. If it runs out of 
goods, not only does the customer not receive goods, but also the supply chain itself 
could perish, resulting in, at best, unfulfilled demand and at worst, loss of life. Thus, 
efficient reuse is critical, as space is at a premium. Furthermore, the logistics 
network in an SSSC could be unstable and variable over time. These self-sustaining 
supply chains, especially within the context of HADR and DoD special operations, 
provide for a unique research opportunity that has not been thoroughly studied (see 
Figure 1). 
For example, consider the supply chain of providing fuel. Transportation of 




There exist numerous challenges in this network if it is to be self-sustaining. It has 
also been researched and proved that such SSSCs can incur significantly higher 
costs than traditional networks (Regnier et al., 2013a; 2013b).  
In this project, we study such challenges in response supply chains, where 
multiple goods are conveyed and consumed through the same network—a network 
that is rife with uncertainty. 
 
Figure 1. Positioning Self-Sustaining Response Supply Chains 
Uncertainty in response supply chains is typified by “unknown unknowns,” to 
quote Donald Rumsfeld. When disaster strikes, authorities do not know who is hurt, 
the severity of the damage, what portions of the network remain or are degraded, 
how the supply chain will develop in the future, where demand will materialize, 
where supply will materialize—to name a few unknowns. The only knowns are the 
goals to save lives and to reduce suffering. Saving lives involves delivering the 
goods that are needed to sustain life—the same goods, such as water, fuel, medical 
supplies, equipment, and information, that self-sustaining supply chains use and 
deliver during their life cycles. In such instances, the transportation capabilities 
needed to deliver goods, save lives, and reduce suffering must be reliable. The 
uncertainties are brought on due to the process of providing relief in a disaster with 




more complex. Understanding the complexities, we believe, will lead to better 
planning for HADR and in turn facilitate effective (in terms of reaching most of the 
affected population) and efficient (in terms of time and money) relief operations in 
case of disaster. There has been evidence that the degree to which a disaster can 
affect depends on the planning (Natarajarathinam, Capar, & Narayanan, 2009). For 
all these reasons, we plan to explore these complexities in SSRSC, thus allowing 
the DoD to identify the burden of cost.   
Literature Review 
Our focus in this article is self-sustaining response supply chain. Supply 
chains in general have received considerable attention as significant cost drivers in 
any operation, whether business, humanitarian, or otherwise (Chopra & Meindl, 
2013; Jacobs & Chase, 2013). Usually the focus is on demand uncertainties (Lee, 
2002) and logistics optimization of a fixed and known network (Chopra, 2003; 
Robeson & Copacino, 1994). Often, this optimization is a delicate balance between 
having maximum flexibility while being able to deal with significant disruptions in the 
supply network (Lim, Bassamboo, Chopra, & Daskin, 2008). 
Sustainable supply chains have received considerable attention in this age of 
green conciseness and fiscal austerity. Supply chain management often achieves 
these through reduction, reuse, and recycling—the latter two “R’s” are often 
performed outside of the traditional supply chain. Furthermore, sustainability has 
been gaining traction in popular literature (McDonough & Braungart, 2010) as well 
as in academic literature (Dey, LaGuardia, & Srinivasan, 2011; McKinnon, Browne, 
& Whiteing, 2012; Seliger, 2007; Wang & Gupta, 2011). Early on, Kleindorfer, 
Singhal, and Van Wassenhove (2005) helped focus the operations community on 
the “Triple Bottom Line”—profit, people, and planet. They argued that sustainability 
is not only a social need but also provides financial benefits to a firm. 
Sustainability is often achieved through a closed-loop supply chain (Guide & 
Van Wassenhove, 2009) where goods are refurbished or remanufactured after their 
virgin uses. This results in the goods being more sustainable since less new material 
is required. Focus has turned toward the closed loop and sustainability in supply 
chain management as environmental legislation and the social consciousness has 
punctuated the need to include the environment in analysis and make the most out 
of existing material (Ferguson & Souza, 2010; McKinnon et al., 2010). Companies 
have begun to realize that profits and sustainability go hand in hand; Walmart has 
been particularly instrumental in bringing sustainability into the mainstream of supply 
chain management (Plambeck & Denend, 2010). 
The post-Cold War environment changed the global power-structure, which 




(Pickering, 2013). On the other hand, due to the missions of DoD, it requires these 
resources. Sustainability facilitates the DoD plan for maintaining such resources. 
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy defined sustainable acquisition as 
“acquiring goods and services in order to create and maintain conditions under 
which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony, and that permits fulfilling 
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans.” (Pickering, 2013)  However, sustainable acquisition does not 
necessarily influence supply chains that are self-sustaining. 
Self-sustaining supply chains extend themselves beyond the reuse and 
recycling. A major challenge in self-sustaining supply chains is that the resources 
consumed while transporting supplies to their destinations need to be provided via 
the network itself. (Dubbs, 2011; Hathorn, 2013, and Regnier, Simon, Nussbaum, & 
Whitney, 2013) have identified the multiplicative effects on cost in such situations.   
Response supply chains are those supply chains that are developed during a 
disaster or a crisis. A disaster has been defined by many government and non-
government organizations. The International Federations of Red Cross (IFRC) 
classified an event as a disaster if that event is “... a sudden, calamitous event that 
seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, 
material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or 
society’s ability to cope using its own resources.” (IFRC), A disaster may lead to a 
crisis as history tells us. For instance, the 2011 Japan earthquake resulted in a 
tsunami and then in explosion of nuclear facilities, resulting in a colossal crisis.  
According to Merriam-Webster, crisis is defined as “an unstable or crucial 
time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending; especially: one with 
the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome” (“Crisis,” n.d.). We also 
define response supply chains as supply chains where crisis exists with a high 
probability. Although, crisis in a supply chain is unpredictable, it may not be 
unexpected (Coombs, 1999). 
Response supply chains (especially in humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief) can be classed as extreme supply chains. Apte (2009) explored the factors at 
play in response supply chains. Disaster relief has been identified as an important 
and complementary area of study to sustainable supply chains (Guide & Van 
Wassenhove, 2003). 
Scholars have given different names to extreme supply chains. However, the 
issues and challenges are similar. Whybark, Melnyk, Day, and Davis (2010) 
discussed the new realities and management challenges for the disaster relief 
supply chains that function under extreme conditions. Such supply chains in austere 




commercial supply chain managers will probably get frustrated in these situations, 
there are lessons to be learned from the private sector (Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
Dash et al. (2013) described the main characteristics of a disaster response 
chain by pointing out specific issues faced by the managers. They indicated two 
major challenges. First, response supply chains must be set up quickly with 
available resources such as information and manpower. Second, the operational 
apparatus of the supply chain needs to be effective due to economic concerns.  
The articles reviewed for this research offered a spectrum of issues and 
challenges for a response supply or for the sustainable supply chain. But in our 
search, we did not find any that dealt with the issues and challenges of a self-
sustaining response supply chain. We believe that this study is one of the first 
attempts to uncover fundamentals of SSRSC. 
The Potential Problem 
Our problem posits a potential supply network with three types of nodes: 
source nodes, coordinating (warehousing) nodes, and demand nodes. The supply 
network has supplies that are sourced from outside the affected region, transported 
through coordination or warehouse nodes, and delivered to the demand centers in 
the affected region. Such an environment can be encountered in many disaster 
situations and combat operations. 
For example, in spite of sufficient supplies to realize their missions and 
perform operations as planned, during Operation Iraqi Freedom’s (OIF) major 
combat operations through the fall of Baghdad, on-hand inventory was lower than 
planned for all commodities except fuel (Peltz et al., 2005). Peltz et al. (2005) found 
that inventories for commodities such as food and water gradually improved but 
spare parts experienced distribution problems.  
Many response supply chains in the face of disaster, such as in the case of 
Hurricane Sandy in the northeastern United States, suffer similar shortages in 
supplies and lack of on-hand, pre-positioned inventory, resulting in delivery issues 
and starving affected population.   
The source nodes supply items such as water, food, or fuel. Examples of the 
suppliers can be found in the private, military, and public sectors. The franchises of 
Nutriset in several countries produce and supply Plumpy’Nut to malnourished 
children in the Horn of Africa through UNICEF (Swaminathan, 2009). During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, though the distribution of food and water gradually 
improved, the spare parts production shortage continued due to high demand on 




The coordination nodes are places where the provisions or emergency 
supplies can be warehoused or transferred to be sent to the affected regions. 
Coordination operations are similar to how the military maintains and operates 
inventory practices ashore or at sea for future events of a conflict or disaster. A 
recent example is the process of relief operations during the 2010 earthquake in 
Japan by the U.S. Navy.  
The demand nodes are in the affected region where the critical supplies reach 
the final destination. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the National 
Guard provided 2.1 million Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs) and over one million bottles 
of water (Gibbs & Holloway, 2013) to the affected population, and these were 
sourced from outside of the affected areas. 
The unanticipated high demand for spare parts in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) showed the inefficiency of the traditional supply chain. The war reserves did 
not contain certain critical items and had inadequate inventory of other items, 
making success extremely difficult in combat operations. In addition, war reserve 
stocks were planned for five months of combat operations. This was much shorter 
than the lead-times for many parts. Lack of funding and support resulted in long 
production lead-times for many items. Moreover, the inadequate national supply with 
forward positioned war reserve and theater supply preparation led to excessive 
transportation cost.  
In such a situation (i.e., OIF), a self-sustaining response supply chain might 
have eased the shortage, long lead-times, and high-cost issues. Having said this, 
the SSRSC is also not without challenges. In the next section, we discuss some of 
the challenges these SSRSCs face.  
Challenges 
The type of disaster plays an inevitable role in the self-sustaining supply chain 
established in response to that disaster. If the disaster is manmade, such as war, the 
supply chains are managed by military organizations through the pre-established 
protocol. In case of a natural disaster, the attributes such as speed of onset and the 
scope of the affected area have an effect on the complexity of humanitarian 
operations as illustrated in Figure 2 (Apte, 2009), thus influencing the response 
supply chain.  
The disasters that are localized offer some focus for the relief operations such 
as the 2010 Haiti earthquake, but the dispersed disasters such as the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami or 2009 H1N1 pandemic stretch the humanitarian organizations’ 
relief operations. We do not necessarily differentiate between the above mentioned 
disasters on the basis of the vastness of the affected area but by the number of 




The disasters that occur with some notice provide lead-time for humanitarian 
responders to organize effective and possibly efficient relief operations. The 
strategic prepositioning such as infrastructure development, capacity planning of 
resources, and asset location can be developed for a slow-onset disaster, whereas 
for sudden-onset disaster, such planning has to be done long before a disaster 
strikes. In some cases, it may not be done at all. In such cases, response may cost 
considerably more, since the United Nations Human Development Program (2007) 
and the World Meteorological Organization (2009) have estimated that every dollar 
invested in preparing for a disaster saves seven dollars in disaster response. 
 
Figure 2. Classification of Disasters  
(Apte & Yoho, 2010) 
A common and natural indicator of complex operations, especially in the 
response phase can plausibly be cost. In this research, we propose that the cost of 
these operations is influenced by the issue of sustainment and is driven by the major 
challenges of speed and dispersion. In a self-sustaining supply chain, the amount of 
resources that must be delivered at the beginning of the supply chain is significantly 
larger than the amount delivered to the ultimate consumer at the end of the supply 
chain. Due to this “multiplier effect,” it has been shown that self-sustaining supply 
chains increase resources and manpower, resulting in significantly higher cost 
(Regnier et al., 2013a; 2013b). Figure 3 illustrates our model for qualitative effects 





























Figure 3. Qualitative Effects of Speed and Dispersion in SSRSC  
Note. Adapted from Apte, Khawam, Regnier, & Simon, 2013  
Dispersion  
From the perspective of a response supply chain for a localized disaster, 
when the infrastructure exists, demand may be treated as consolidated within a 
region—affected people can access relief supplies at a larger, centralized demand 
center. Large and scattered demand in the affected region in case of a dispersed 
disaster may increase the need for coordination and collaboration among the relief 
organizations. This may result in a higher level of complexity of operations. The 
dispersion leads to more demand points at the end of longer supply chains, resulting 
in substantial increases in the cost of operations. 
Speed 
In case of a slow-onset disaster, there may be some lead-time in setting up 
and even beginning operations for the supply chain. A response supply chain could 
benefit from economies of scale leading to larger convoys and larger lot sizes. In 
case of a sudden-onset disaster, on the other hand, due to the urgency of the 
demand, there may be more suppliers involved, and the uncertainty of demand may 
force smaller loads to be deployed in vehicles with lesser capacity. This results in a 
larger multiplier on one or more stages of the supply chain, which in turn leads to 























The issue of the response supply chain being self-sustaining means that the 
resources consumed by the relief operations must be provided through the supply 
chain. Generally, response supply chains become self-sustaining only in austere 
regions, where disaster or conflict has made resources locally unavailable. One such 
resource is fuel. Researchers (Dubbs, 2011; Hathorn, 2013, and Regnier, Simon, 
Nussbaum, & Whitney, 2013) have identified the multiplier effect for fuel. Their study 
focused on situations where the fuel requirement due to self-sustainment is 
significantly larger. Dubbs (2011) estimated that in Helmand Province in 
Afghanistan, from Camp Leatherneck to a forward operating base that was remote, 
the supply chain consumed 72% of the fuel that was delivered. Hathorn (2013) 
estimated that a supply route from San Diego to the Spratly Islands under threat 
may consume 25% to 90% of what it delivers, depending on the convoy 
composition.  
Discussion 
In understanding the effects of speed and dispersion, it is important to 
recognize that these factors affect the cost both directly and indirectly. Speed and 
dispersion affect the multipliers, which in turn affect the total cost of the operations.  
If the speed of onset is higher due to urgent demand, the frequency of 
deliveries to the demand nodes increases. It also reduces the amount delivered per 
trip due to shortened lead-time for procuring commodities from the suppliers. 
Another aspect of urgent demand is using the available, at times inefficient, modes 
of transportation. All these factors increase the consumption rate along the supply 
chain. Since transport and handling are more inefficient and consume a greater 
portion of the resources at any point in the supply chain, leaving less to be delivered 
to the affected population, the increase in the speed of onset of a conflict or disaster 
increases the multiplier effect on the supply chain, resulting in increased total cost.  
If there is larger dispersion in the affected area, this may increase the scope 
and scale of the demand in terms of both larger distances for delivering the demand 
and a larger number of demand centers. Our intention, as indicated in Figure 3, is to  
model dispersion in terms of both distance and number of demand centers and finds 
both increased cost and the multiplier effect of self-sustaining supply chains. It is 
interesting to note that if either one (distance or demand) increases, cost increases 
much faster if the other is also increasing, that is, if there is an interaction effect.  
There is a similar positive interaction between speed and dispersion. That is 
to say that we find that the complexity of operations increases not only due to 
increase in the speed of onset and affected area but these factors themselves 




The multiplier effect in a supply chain intensifies the supply costs and 
resource requirements due to a self-sustaining network. Therefore, for an SSRSC 
with several stages, a sudden-onset disaster will have a larger total cost than 
estimated in an analysis that neglects the impact of self-sustainment.  
Conclusion 
We set out to study the issues and challenges for SSRSCs. The multiplier 
effect associated with SSSCs has been examined. The primary considerations in an 
SSSC are the length of the supply chain, in terms of both distance and the number 
of stages, and the characteristics of the transport vehicles. However, in this study we 
added the complexity of “response,” typically in expeditionary or extreme 
environments. The complexity of humanitarian operations depends on speed of 
onset and dispersion of demand in the affected area. The issues and challenges 
have been studied through lessons learned after a disaster strikes. Combining self-
sustainment with these major factors increases the complexity further. One of the 
significant insights we gained from this study is that the resource demands 
associated with logistics operations are more costly than their direct acquisition and 
operating costs. Total cost in an SSRSC increases considerably due to the indirect 
cost the transportation and handling incurs by requiring delivery of additional 
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